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IS YOUR SMARTPHONE CONVERSATION
PRIVATE? THE STINGRAY DEVICE’S IMPACT ON
PRIVACY IN STATES
Katherine M. Sullivan+
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to provide that,
“subject only to a few, specifically established and well-delineated, exceptions,”
the search or seizure of a person or place must be supported by a warrant.1
However, the Twenty-First Century, with its fast-pace, ever-changing
technology, has introduced devices that place a strain on the application of this
constitutional right. The StingRay device is one such example. The StingRay
is a mobile surveillance system that mimics a cell tower so that cell phones and
other mobile devices in the vicinity connect to it, thereby revealing the unique
identifier and location of those devices.2
The StingRay devices are more commonly known as cell-site simulators,3 but
these devices were not originally invented for these purposes. Currently, the
devices are used to locate suspects in the United States for alleged crimes,
including fraud and drug trafficking.4 The devices were originally designed for
surveillance abroad by entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).5
Due to national security concerns and international challenges, the CIA sought
+
I am grateful for the insights and assistance from my mentor, Joe S. Cecil, Senior Research
Associate, Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C. Your expertise in this area of law was
invaluable.
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few, specifically established and well-delineated, exceptions.”).
2. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last updated Mar. 2018)
[hereinafter Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?]; see also Ellen Nakashima, Justice
Department: Agencies Need Warrants to Use Cellphone Trackers, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-agencies-will-haveto-obtain-warrant-before-using-cellphone-surveillance-technology/2015/09/03/08e44b70-525511e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html.
3. Street-Level Surveillance: Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators/faq (last visited Apr. 18, 2018) [herein
after Street-Level Surveillance].
4. Id.
5. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: Stingrays, the Spy Tool the Government Tried, and Failed,
to Hide, WIRED (May 6, 2016, 6:41 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/hacker-lexicon-stingray
s-spy-tool-government-tried-failed-hide/ (“Although use of the spy technology goes back at least
20 years . . . their use of it has grown in the last decade as mobile phones and devices have become
ubiquitous. Today, they’re used by the military and CIA in conflict zones—to prevent adversaries
from using a mobile phone to detonate roadside bombs, for example—as well as domestically by
federal agencies . . . .”).
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this technology because it was almost impossible to rely on cooperation from
local telephone providers in foreign countries.6 Thus, these devices were created
in the interest of national security and counter-terrorism.7
Private manufacturers—after discovering how invaluable and indispensable
these devices were—sought to fill the demand.8 The Harris Corporation, the
major manufacturer of the StingRay devices, did exactly that.9 After many
devices were purchased by the federal government, the Harris Corporation
sought to expand their market share into law enforcement agencies at both the
state and local level.10 The StingRay market has now expanded into state and
local agencies; there are currently “72 agencies identified in 24 states and the
District of Columbia that own StingRays.”11
Judges and defense attorneys were in the dark about these new devices for
some time.12 When judges signed off on warrants, they often did so without
knowing what the devices did and the implications from signing the warrant. 13
Often, judges failed to appreciate the degree of invasiveness of the StingRay
devices. Other times, the warrant application would deliberately use the vague
term of “technology” to encompass devices like the StingRay, leaving the judge
unaware of all that would be included under the umbrella of that term.14
Historically, judges have been aware of pen registers being used, which only
provide specific phone numbers of a cell phone;15 however, StingRay devices

6. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less
than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform
of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 146 n.38 (2013).
7. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 3.
8. See id.
9. See Allison Grande, Immigration Officials Pushed to Detail Cellphone Tracking, LAW360
(May 19, 2017, 8:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/926160/immigration-officials-pushedto-detail-cellphone-tracking (noting that the Harris Corporation uses the “StingRay” label as the
now, well-known branding name of the device).
10. Kris Hermes, Law Enforcement Uses StingRays to Spy on Americans and Lies About It,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2016, 2:11 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kris-hermes/lawenforcement-uses-stin_b_12080634.html.
11. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 2.
12. Nathan Freed Wessler, ACLU-Obtained Documents Reveal Breadth of Secretive Stingray
Use in Florida, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 22, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/fr
ee-future/aclu-obtained-documents-reveal-breadth-secretive-stingray-use-florida.
13. Id.
14. See Andrew Hemmer, Note, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The New Heightened
Judicial Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI. -KENT L. REV. 295, 306–07 (2016) (“Congress
enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, and one provision of the Act amended the definition of a ‘pen
register’ to make it more encompassing. Due to this amendment to the Pen Register Statute, law
enforcement agencies have been able to convince some magistrates to issue court orders under the
statute for the use of Stingrays.”).
15. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (“A pen register is a mechanical device
that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when
the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
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provide much more than a ten-digit phone number, they provide the content of
the phone calls and the precise location of the device.16 Furthermore, defense
attorneys rarely know whether StingRay devices were used in obtaining
evidence against their clients, which makes it more difficult to defend their
clients.17 Ultimately, an individual’s Fourth Amendment right is at risk if state
and local law enforcement lack clear guidance to determine when it is
appropriate to use a StingRay without a warrant.
This Comment will investigate the impact of the StingRay device on an
individual’s Fourth Amendment right and how state and local law enforcement
will know whether they require a warrant to use the device. Part I explains how
the U.S. Supreme Court has adapted to the changes in technology regarding
privacy rights, as well as how some states have dealt with this issue. Part II
analyzes how smartphones in public and private areas should not factor into the
analysis of whether a warrant is valid.
Part III proposes how state legislatures and judges can help protect the privacy
rights of the citizens of their states. Part IV concludes that, with regard to
smartphones, there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy, which requires
a valid warrant before any government intrusion. This Comment advocates that
the state legislatures that lack legislation specifically addressing the StingRay
device should adopt one to protect its citizens’ privacy rights. Moreover, if the
state chooses not to adopt such a law, the judiciary must ensure that individual
privacy rights remain protected.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS ADAPTATION TO ADVANCEMENTS IN
TECHNOLOGY
A. The Intention of the Founding Fathers in the Creation of the Fourth
Amendment
The Fourth Amendment establishes:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.18

indicate whether calls are actually completed.” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 161 n.1 (1977))).
16. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 3.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment has two clauses, the “reasonableness
clause” and the “warrant clause.” The former establishes the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects. The latter clause sets out the
requirements of any valid warrant. There is also a judicial read-in of the Exclusionary Rule. See
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American citizens have been entitled to this protection since the Fourth
Amendment was ratified by the states in 1791.19 The protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures grew from the disdain of the English
government’s practice of issuing writs of assistance and other general warrants
in the colonies.20 To remedy this perceived injustice, the Founding Fathers
carefully sculpted the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that a man’s house is his
castle and any general authority to search and seize him, his goods, or his papers
should not invade the sanctity of his home.21
B. When Is a Warrant Required?
Once the Fourth Amendment applies, it is necessary to determine which
circumstances require a warrant. A warrant is “a written order issued by a
judicial officer or other authorized person commanding a law enforcement
officer to perform some act incident to the administration of justice.”22 It is
required to search or seize “persons, houses, papers, and effects” of private
individuals.23 The warrant must be sufficiently specific and turns on whether
the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the person, place, or
thing to be searched or seized.24
Through a well-developed body of law, courts have recognized a distinction
between a search and a seizure. Specifically, a seizure is a “meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interest,”25 and a search “occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable
is infringed.”26 Without a valid warrant, searches and seizures performed by
government actors are deemed presumptively invalid. Consequently, any
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in state court and
federal court).
19. The States ratified the Fourth Amendment on December 15, 1791. U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. Furthermore, the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as inapplicable to nonresident
aliens briefly in the United States searched by United States agents. See United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“[I]t suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth
Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”).
20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886).
21. Id. at 630 (“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his
conviction of some public offence.”).
22. Warrant, LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/warrant (last
visited Mar. 5, 2017).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(incorporating the infamous reasonable expectation of privacy test into the Fourth Amendment).
25. Unites States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
26. Id.
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evidence seized without a warrant will be inadmissible at trial unless a court
finds that the search was reasonable under the circumstances.27
1. Valid Search Warrant
Search warrants may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause.28 To
establish probable cause the search warrant must: be supported by oath or
affirmation by an officer;29 issued by a neutral and detached magistrate;30 and
“contain a particularized description of the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.”31 The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States stated that
probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within [the police
officer’s] knowledge . . . of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution,” to believe
that a criminal offense has been committed or is about to take place.32 In Illinois
v. Gates, the Court held that determining whether probable cause exists requires
a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.33 As such, the warrant must be
sufficiently particular in describing what is to be searched and what is to be
seized to permit a proper determination of probable cause.
2. A Warrant Is Not Always Required by Law
Courts have carved out certain exceptions to the warrant requirement,34 one
of which is the “exigent circumstances” exception.35 Exigent circumstances

27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”).
28. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925).
29. The Fourth Amendment provides that warrants must be founded on probable cause and
supported by oath or affirmation. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).
30. The magistrate cannot be involved directly with the investigation. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.
v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (finding a judge to be the leader of the search party, thus
violating this requirement, when he assisted the officers in finding the effects of the warrant, and
in some circumstances, deferring to the officers’ discretion).
31. United States v. Hazelwood, 412 F. App’x 617, 618 (4th Cir. 2011).
32. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
33. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
34. These circumstances include the community caretaking exception, the automobile
exception, and a search incident to arrest. See Fern Lynn Kletter, Annotation, Necessity of
Rendering Medical Assistance as Circumstance Permitting Warrantless Entry or Search of
Building or Premises, 58 A.L.R. 6th 499 Art. 1 § 2 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court
recognized a community caretaking exception to the warrant clause); accord United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (recognizing an automobile exception to the warrant clause);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (recognizing the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant clause).
35. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (“One well-recognized exception applies
when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978))).
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exist when obtaining a warrant would be impractical under the circumstances.
If an officer can show that an “exigent circumstance” exists, the officer may
enter a home without violating the individual’s constitutional right to be safe
from an unreasonable search and seizure.36
Application of this principle to the StingRay device is complicated by the fact
that the officer never physically enters the home, yet is able to remotely secure
information from within the home—such as whether certain individuals are
located in the home. Thus, such an invasion by law enforcement generally
requires a warrant. However, exigent circumstances may exist if, for example,
law enforcement sought to secure an individual’s location but securing a warrant
would permit the suspect to evade capture.37 In other words, obtaining the
warrant would be impractical under the circumstances.
C. Supreme Court Rulings: Technology and the Fourth Amendment
Proper enquiry into whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to “be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” was violated must first
establish that law enforcement in fact conducted a search.38 If there is no search,
then there is no need to apply the Fourth Amendment. To determine if law
enforcement conducted a search, courts ask two questions: (1) whether that
person had an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the expectation is
one which society recognizes as reasonable.39
In Kyllo v. United States, an officer suspected that the defendant was growing
marijuana in his house.40 To determine whether the suspicion was correct, the
police—located in a public roadway—aimed a thermal-imaging device at the
defendant’s home.41 Based on the information provided by the device, the police
obtained a search warrant for the home and subsequently found marijuana.42
The lower court looked at the defendant’s subjective and objective expectation

36. The Supreme Court has outlined many exigent circumstances including: officers chasing
a fleeing suspect in hot pursuit and entering premises in order to prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence. King, 563 U.S. at 460.
37. United States v. Ellis, No. 13-CR-00818 PJH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136217, at *41
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017) (holding that a warrant was not required when using a Stingray to
determine a suspect’s location when the risk of flight and possession of firearms by the individual
constituted an exigent circumstance); see also United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir.
2016) (“A person wanted on probable cause (and an arrest warrant) who is taken into custody in a
public place, where he had no legitimate expectation of privacy, cannot complain about how the
police learned his location.”).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the Fourth Amendment Right extends to unreasonable
searches or seizures by law enforcement, this Comment focuses exclusively on unreasonable
searches.
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id. at 30.
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of privacy.43 It determined that because the defendant made no effort to hide the
heat being emitted from his house, and because the thermal-imaging device did
not disclose any personal information about the defendant, the use of the
thermal-imaging device by police did not require a warrant.44 In other words,
law enforcement’s use of the device did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the information obtained by the
thermal-imaging machine—the heat signature given off by equipment to grow
the marijuana plants—was a search under the Fourth Amendment.45 The Court
reasoned that, without the use of the device, police would only have access to
that information by physically intruding into a protected area of the defendant’s
home; therefore, the use of the device constituted a constitutionally protected
search. The Court further reasoned that because the thermal-imaging device was
not in “general public use,” the search was “presumptively unreasonable without
a warrant.”46
1. Electronic Listening Devices
In Katz v. United States, the government sought to introduce evidence
obtained by an electronic listening device attached to the exterior of a public
telephone booth while the defendant used it.47 The defendant regularly used the
public telephone booth to make calls regarding illicit activity, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had knowledge of this regular occurrence.48 The
Supreme Court, in overruling the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that once
the defendant was in the telephone booth and shut the door, he was guaranteed
that the words he spoke in those conversations would remain private.49 The
Court found that the FBI agents ignored the defendant’s right under the Fourth
Amendment when they obtained the telephone booth conversations without a
search warrant.50
As technology advanced, the Supreme Court looked at the government’s
usage of beepers and electronic tracking devices in criminal investigations. In
United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation when, without a warrant, law enforcement agents

43. Id. at 31.
44. Id. at 30–31.
45. Id. at 34–35.
46. Id. at 40.
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
48. Id. at 354.
49. Id. at 352; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that
eavesdropping accomplished by mans of an electronic device that penetrated the premises occupied
by petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion, but its protections goes further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all.”).
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monitored a beeper that was located in a container of chloroform loaded in a car,
as it traveled through public streets and highways.51 The Court reasoned that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his car’s
movements on public roads, and as a result, the monitoring of the beeper by the
police did not constitute an unconstitutional search.52 In other words, the Knotts
Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the monitoring of tracking
devices in public areas.53
However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo carved out an exception
to its holding in Knotts.54 With a court order, law enforcement agents placed a
beeper in a container of ether, which was transported by public roads and
ultimately stored in a private home.55 Due to the storage of the container in the
private area, the Court held that the monitoring of the device within a private
home violated the Fourth Amendment.56 Therefore, to determine whether the
monitoring of a person violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
would consider the nature of the place in which the individual was being
monitored; that is, whether the area is public or private.57
2. Physical Placement of a Tracking Device on Personal Property
In the 2012 case United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court considered
whether the placement of a tracking device on an automobile triggered Fourth
Amendment protections.58 The defendant in Jones was suspected of trafficking
drugs. As a result, law enforcement agents sought to monitor Jones’s activity,
and after obtaining a warrant, installed a tracking device on the bottom of his
wife’s car while it was parked in a public parking lot.59
The warrant only authorized installation of the tracking device in the District
of Columbia and was set to expire after ten days.60 In contradiction of the
51. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
to another.”).
52. Id. at 285.
53. Id. at 282. Courts have asked the question of whether the electronic tracking devices
provide information that the police could otherwise not have obtained by visual surveillance. If
answered in the negative, it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. Compare id. at 285
(finding no search when monitoring a beeper placed on a car on public roads), with United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (finding that a search occurred when the police monitored a
beeper which entered into a home).
54. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
55. Id. at 708.
56. Id. at 714. (“[T]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to
visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest
in the privacy of the residence.”).
57. Id. at 714–15.
58. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
59. Id. at 402–03. The warrant was issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia after the agents lawfully surveilled the suspect.
60. Id.
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warrant, the agents placed the tracking device on the car on the eleventh day and
in Maryland.61 The Court determined that installing the device constituted a
Fourth Amendment search.62 Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority, held that
physical occupation of private property by means of the tracking device violated
the Fourth Amendment.63 He reasoned that because the defendant possessed the
vehicle at the time the government attached the device to the car, it violated the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.64
In his concurrence, Justice Alito recognized the changing aspects of
technology and focused more on the scope and duration of the government’s use
of the device.65 Justice Alito believed the proper inquiry to the issue was
“whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove,”
notwithstanding the public character of the car’s movements.66
3. Possession of a Defendant’s Cell Phone
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California67 addressed the
issue of “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information
on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”68 The
defendant in Riley was a gang member who was arrested for possession of
concealed and loaded firearms following a traffic stop. Incident to his arrest,
law enforcement subsequently seized and searched his mobile phone.69
The specific facts of the case are as follows. Riley was driving on expired
registration tags and a suspended driver’s license when he was pulled over by
the police. Pursuant to department policy, the police were allowed to impound
the car and conduct an inventory search.70 During this search, police found
photographs of the defendant standing in front of a car suspected to have been
61. Id. at 403.
62. Id. at 404.
63. Justice Scalia reasoned that because the government “physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information,” it would have been considered a “physical
intrusion” and search “within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. at
404–05.
64. Id. at 404. The ruling in Jones caused a “sea change” inside the U.S. Department of
Justice. Speaking after the decision, FBI General Counsel Andrew Weissmann noted that it
prompted the FBI to turn off about 3,000 GPS tracking devices that were in use. See Julia Angwin,
FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2012,
3:36 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-aftersupreme-court-ruling.
65. Jones, 565 U.S. at 419.
66. Id.
67. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
68. Id. at 2480.
69. The phone, a smartphone, was seized from the defendant’s pants pocket and was searched
by the police because “gang members will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of
themselves with the guns.” Id. at 2480–81.
70. Id. at 2480.
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involved in a shooting weeks earlier.71 Ultimately, the defendant was charged
with attempted murder, firing at an occupied vehicle, and assault with a
semiautomatic weapon in connection with that shooting. At trial, Riley
unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence acquired during this search.72
The Supreme Court found that the evidence from his cell phone used at trial
was discovered through an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.73
The Court considered whether the government had a legitimate interest in
assessing the material on the phone without a warrant.74 The Court found that
the search was unnecessary for the protection of the officers and held that the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.75
The Court reasoned that since “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself
be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer,” the search incident to arrest
exception did not apply.76 Furthermore, the Court found the governmental
interests were minimal compared to the degree of intrusion against the
defendant, and therefore, triggering the warrant requirement to access the
contents of the phone.77
Although Riley was in custody and, as such, had reduced privacy interests,
they did not disappear entirely.78 The Court specifically rejected the
government’s argument that the “officers could search cell phone data if they
could have obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.”79

71. Id. at 2481.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2495.
74. Id. at 2484.
75. Id. at 2485. Generally, the search incident to arrest exception allows the officer to search
an arrestee’s person and the immediate area in order to find weapons that may be used against him
or would allow the arrestee “to resist arrest or effect his escape.” Id. at 2486 (quoting Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
76. Interestingly, the Court left open the possibility for law enforcement to search the
“physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon—say, to determine
whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case.” Id. at 2485 (emphasis added).
However, as discussed, this search involved data, not razor blades. The Court also addressed
another warrant exception: the prevention of destruction of evidence. To this point, the Court ruled
that under these circumstances, where the defendant’s phone was already secured, “there is no
longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.”
Id. at 2486. Moreover, the Court discussed the possibility of remote wiping, and noted that the
officers could do two things to prevent this: (1) “turn the phone off or remove its battery”; or (2)
“leave [the] phone powered on and place it in an enclosure that isolates the phone from radio
waves.” These enclosures are commonly called “Faraday bags.” Id. at 2487.
77. Id. at 2495.
78. Id. at 2488.
79. Id. at 2493. To illustrate the Chief Justice’s point, “the fact that a search in the pre-digital
era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of
photos in a digital gallery.” Id. Similarly, “the fact that someone could have tucked a paper bank
statement in a pocket does not justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years.”
Id. The Court here was clearly worried about the degree of intrusion and quantity of data acquired
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Because the amount of digital data that can be stored on a phone is far greater
than what one single person can put in their pockets, the Court concluded:
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience.
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many
Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not
make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the
Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do
before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly
simple—get a warrant.80
D. The Department of Justice Policy Regarding StingRay Devices
1. Federal Government Addressing the Issue
On September 3, 2015, about a year after the Riley decision, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) instituted a new policy requiring the FBI and other federal
agencies to obtain a search warrant before using the StingRay device.81 In the
application for a warrant, the new policy requires DOJ officials to specifically
disclose to judges that a cell-site simulator will be used and “describe in general
terms the technique to be employed.”82 The DOJ’s policy allows for exempted
circumstances that would permit law enforcement agents to use the device
without first obtaining a search warrant.83 It is important to note that this policy
applies in all instances involving the DOJ’s use of StingRay devices “in support
of other Federal agencies and/or State and Local law enforcement agencies.”84
2. Where Do States Stand on the Issue?
Even though the DOJ policy applies when the federal government uses the
device to assist state and local law enforcement, it fails to extend to scenarios

in these searches when compared to singular, individual documents discoverable in the pre-digital
world.
80. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
81. Press Release, No. 15-1084, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice
Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015), https://w
ww.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
82. Id.
83. Exigent circumstances would be included in the exception to the warrant requirement.
The exigent circumstances described are those very same exceptions in the non-digital world:
“These include the need to protect human life or a very serious injury; the prevention of the
imminent destruction of evidence; the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by
a suspect or convicted fugitive from justice.” Id. Other circumstances excluded from the warrant
requirement involve situations in which obtaining a search warrant is “impracticable.” However,
the Department expects these circumstances “to be very limited” and requires executive level
approval of a warrantless search. Id.
84. Id.

2018]

Is Your Smartphone Conversation Private?

399

where state and local governments act on their own. Former Representative
Jason Chaffetz, a Republican from Utah, introduced the Cell-Site Simulator Act
of 2015, also known as the Stingray Privacy Act to the House of Representatives
in November of 2015 to address that concern.85 The new bill would require state
and local law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant before they could use
cell-cite simulator devices in pursuit of charges under Title 18 of the United
States Code.86 However, the bill as introduced by Representative Chaffetz never
made it out of committee; this left state and local authorities in the same position:
warrant limbo.
The following chart illustrates the use of cell-site simulators at the state and
local law enforcement level.87
States that currently have local
Washington
police using cell-site simulators
Nevada
Arizona
New Mexico
Missouri
Georgia
Massachusetts
Alaska
States that currently have state
Oklahoma
police using cell-site simulators
Louisiana
Delaware
Pennsylvania
States that currently have both local
California
and state police using cell-site
Texas
simulators
Virginia
North Carolina
Maryland
New York
Florida
Michigan
Indiana
Illinois
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Tennessee

85. Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015).
86. Id. § 2(a).
87. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 2.
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Although the extent of the use of cell-site simulators in the states not listed
above is unknown, the American Civil Liberties Union has identified seventytwo law enforcement agencies in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
that own StingRay devices.88 Notably, however, some of these state legislatures
have enacted laws to protect their residents against unreasonable use of these.
The following table is illustrative:89
California
Enacted in 2015
Requires warrant for
both historical and realtime location data
Colorado
Enacted in 2014
Requires warrant for
location data obtained
from devices but not
from service providers
Illinois
Enacted in 2014
Protects only real-time
location data
Indiana
Enacted in 2014
Protects only real-time
location data, but also
requires warrant for
drone use and for
electronic
device
searches
Iowa
Enacted in 2014
Applies only to Global
Positioning
System
(GPS) tracking devices
Maine
Enacted in 2013
Requires warrant for
both historical and realtime location data
Maryland
Enacted in 2014
Applies only real-time
location data
Minnesota
Enacted in 2014
Requires warrant for
both historical and realtime location data
Montana
Enacted in 2013
Requires warrant for
both historical and realtime location data
New Hampshire
Enacted in 2015
Requires warrant for
both historical and realtime location data

88. Id.
89. Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 26, 2015, 1:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-locatio
n-privacy-legislation-states-2015.

2018]

Is Your Smartphone Conversation Private?

Tennessee

Enacted in 2014

Utah

Enacted in 2014

Virginia

Enacted in 2015

Washington

Enacted in 2015

Wisconsin

Enacted in 2014
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Amended
to
undermine all protections
Requires warrant for
both historical and realtime location data, as
well
as
electronic
communications content
Requires warrant for
use of StingRay devices

Requires warrant for
use of StingRay devices
Permits
location
tracking under a less
protective legal standard

As demonstrated in the above table, these fifteen states have enacted a law
addressing warrants and the use of cell-site stimulators. The protections vary
from either requiring a warrant for historical information, real-time location, or
a hybrid of both.
Even though some states have not passed legislation on the matter, they have
been subjected to limitations by their own judiciary. For example, in Tracey v.
State, the Florida Supreme Court required a warrant for real-time location
information that would be obtained through use of the StingRay device.90 In
attempting to develop a workable framework, the Florida Supreme Court
rejected the application of the mosaic theory to the Fourth Amendment search
analysis.
The mosaic theory stands for the proposition that “discrete acts of surveillance
by law enforcement may be lawful in isolation, but may otherwise infringe on
reasonable expectations of privacy in the aggregate because they ‘paint an
intimate picture of a defendant’s life.’”91 However, the court noted that applying
the theory was “problematic where traditional surveillance becomes a search
only after some specified period of time.”92 It concluded “that basing the
90. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“Therefore, we hold that regardless of
Tracey’s location on public roads, the use of his cell site location information emanating from his
cell phone in order to track him in real time was a search within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment for which probable cause was required.”).
91. Id. at 520 (quoting United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740, 771 (D. Md. 2013)).
92. Id.
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determination as to whether warrantless real time cell-site location tracking
violates the Fourth Amendment on the length of time the cell phone is monitored
is not a workable analysis.”93 Thus, every decision would need to be made on a
case-by-case basis.94
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had a
subjective expectation of privacy that society was now prepared to recognize as
reasonable, thereby requiring a warrant. This rang true even when the defendant
was on a public road and did not voluntarily convey his whereabouts to the
service provider “for any purpose other than to enable use of his cell phone for
its intended purpose.”95
In State v. Earls, the Supreme Court of New Jersey confronted the issue of
whether the warrant requirement applied when police obtain a defendant’s cell
phone location information from a cell phone service provider.96 Phrased
another way, the New Jersey Supreme Court “consider[ed] whether people have
a constitutional right of privacy in cell-phone location information.”97 The facts
of Earls stemmed from the investigation of a series of residential burglaries in
the Middletown Township. The police obtained a court order to trace a cell
phone stolen in one of the burglaries. The trace led police to a man in possession
of the stolen phone who reported purchasing the phone from his cousin—
defendant Thomas Earls.98
After obtaining assistance from Earls’ former girlfriend, police located the
stolen material in a storage unit belonging to the former girlfriend. The next
day, the girlfriend’s relative contacted police to report that Earls learned of her
cooperation with police and threatened to harm her in retaliation. Immediately,
police obtained an arrest warrant for Earls and initiated an aggressive attempt to
locate Earls and his potential hostage.99 To locate them, police contacted his
mobile service provider without seeking a court order or warrant to obtain his
cell phone location information.100 After three separate cell phone location
tracings and with the assistance of a neighboring police department, police
located and arrested Earls.101

93. Id.
94. Id. (“It requires case-by-case, after-the-fact, ad hoc determinations whether the length of
the monitoring crossed the threshold of the Fourth Amendment in each case challenged.”).
95. Id. at 525.
96. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013).
97. Id.
98. Earls’ cousin further alleged that Earls “had been involved in residential burglaries and
kept the proceeds in a storage unit that either defendant or his former girlfriend, Desiree Gates, had
rented.” Id. at 633. After police contacted Gates, she agreed to assist police in the investigation
and led police to the location of the storage unit where they found the stolen material. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 633–34.
101. Id. at 634.
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Based on state constitutional grounds, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that an individual’s privacy interests extended to the location of his or her cell
phone.102 The court held that the police must “obtain a warrant based on a
showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant
requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone.”103
Today, New Jersey lacks legislation mandating that law enforcement obtain a
warrant to access cell phone location information, but the basis for this
protection rests on their state constitutional jurisprudence.104
For the states that lack either legislative or judicial safeguards against
government use of cell phone location data, the question remains: How will
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights remain protected?
II. CONSIDER THE SMARTPHONE AN EXTENSION OF YOUR HOME
Before the first smartphone came out, an individual carried the basic cell
phone that was used solely to connect through voice and text communication.
Now it is impossible to walk down the street without someone bumping into you
as they scroll the Internet in the palm of their hand. Smartphones expand to each
corner of an individual’s life: one can now pay for things; store airplane boarding
passes; lock one’s home; and navigate their way across any distance in real time
with extreme precision. Indeed, many consider the smartphone an extension of
an individual’s home—just like wallets, car keys, and wedding rings, one never
leaves home without it. The inherent danger in that, however, is that such
technological advances are equally as accessible to state and local law
enforcement.
A. How Smartphones Function Versus Old Technology
There is a big difference between a cell phone and a smartphone, the former
is only used to communicate by text and call, while the latter, in addition to these

102. Id. at 632.
103. Id. at 644. Interestingly, even though the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a warrant
was required, it remanded the case to the Appellate Division “to determine whether the emergency
aid doctrine applies to the facts of this case under the newly restated test.” Id. at 646.
104. Id. at 632.
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functions can access the internet, which includes location or GPS services.105
Currently, there are more gadgets than people in the world.106
1. StingRays Versus Pen Registers
In its 2015 policy, the DOJ required that cell-site simulators must be
configured in a “manner that is consistent with” the Pen Register Statute.107 Pen
Registers are similar to StingRays in that some information from a cell phone
can be obtained. The major difference lies, however, in the vast quantity and
more intrusive degree of information that can be obtained using the StingRay.
Pen Registers are defined under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, as “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication.”108 Simply stated, Pen Registers only document the phone
numbers called and received on a particular phone. On the other hand, the more
intrusive StingRay device is much more advanced.109 The devices have been
described as “portable spy device[s] able to track cell phone signals inside
vehicles, homes and insulated buildings.”110
One major difference the smartphone introduces into this analysis is the
amount of time and resources expended by law enforcement when attempting to
locate a suspect. In cases like Knotts, the government needed to physically place
a beeper on the individual’s person while it was limited in range. 111 With the

105. See Jason Gordon, How Does GPS Work on Cell Phones?, USA TODAY, http://travel
tips.usatoday.com/gps-work-cell-phones-21574.html (last updated Sept. 12, 2017) (“Cell phones
with GPS receivers communicate with units from among the 30 global positioning satellites in the
GPS system. The built-in receiver trilaterates your position using data from at least three GPS
satellites and the receiver. GPS can determine your location by performing a calculation based on
the intersection point of overlapping spheres determined by the satellites and your phone’s GPS
receiver. In simple terms, trilateration uses the distance between the satellites and the receiver to
create overlapping ‘spheres’ that intersect in a circle. The intersection is your location on the
ground.”).
106. Zachary Davies Boren, There Are Officially More Mobile Devices than People in the
World, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 7, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgetsand-tech/news/there-are-officially-more-mobile-devices-than-people-in-the-world-9780518.html.
107. DOJ Press Release, supra note 81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3125 (2012)).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland relied on a
different definition than is found in the statute, as this case predated the enactment of this statute.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (defining a pen register as “a mechanical
device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused
when the dial on the telephone is released”).
109. See generally Clarence Walker, New Hi-Tech Police Surveillance: The “Stingray” Cell
Phone Spying Device, GLOBAL RES. (May 19, 2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/new-hi-techpolice-surveillance-the-stingray-cell-phone-spying-device/5331165.
110. Id.
111. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
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smartphone, the government can track the device’s location remotely and in real
time, as long as it is turned on and registering with a cell tower.112
The type of information StingRays collect is called metadata. Metadata is the
“data about the communication that allows the communication to successfully
reach its intended recipient.”113 It includes: the location that the message
originated from; the device that sent or made the communication; the times at
which the message was made and sent; and the length or duration of the
message.114 Without having proper protections on metadata, individuals can be
tracked and followed continuously and without warning. Metadata reveals a lot
about the individual and, when in the wrong hands, can identify and outline
many personal details about the individual.
There is also a difference between private and governmental uses of metadata.
Companies want metadata because they can capitalize on a target audience for
marketing purposes—as they could learn the likes and dislikes of the individual
consumer. But when the government collects metadata, it could build a profile
of any individual for a myriad of reasons. Individuals often willingly allow
companies like Facebook to collect metadata, which is how many tech
companies survive. However, when it comes to the government’s use of
metadata, individuals are being tracked unwittingly.
2. Public Versus Private Areas
Another issue to consider is whether the cell phone’s location matters. For
example, as a person travels home, would she reasonably expect that the
government could track her because she was using her mobile phone to get
there? Law abiding citizen or not, one should not feel threatened by the
government’s unreasonable conduct.
Applying the Supreme Court precedent in Kyllo to the StingRay device, it is
clear that the use of the device without a warrant to monitor the movements of
an individual inside her own home would constitute an unconstitutional search
because “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the
house.’”115 Using the precedent established in Katz, just as the Fourth
Amendment protected the privacy of the defendant’s conversation in a public
telephone booth, it should also protect an individual’s cell phone conversation

112. See Gordon, supra note 105 (“Even the cell phones that don’t have GPS can use cell tower
position and distance to calculate your location. Cell phones function by communicating with
towers connected to a base station in a configuration called a ‘cell.’ As you move through the cell,
the base station monitors your cell phone’s signal and transfers it to the nearest tower.”).
113. Metadata, PRIVACY INT’L, https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/53 (last visited
Nov. 28, 2016).
114. Id.
115. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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in her car or other visible public locations from being “broadcast[ed] to the
world.”116
Unlike the situation in Knotts, but like the circumstances in Karo, an
individual almost certainly would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his phone’s movement on public roads. The mobile phone is an extension of the
“firm line” of the home and may be properly characterized as part of the private
residence, the Supreme Court should come to a conclusion that a warrantless
monitoring of a cell phone, which “reveal[ed] no information that could not have
been obtained through visual surveillance,” was an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.117
Using Justice Scalia’s rationale in Jones, the government would “physically
occup[y] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” as soon as
it begins using the StingRay device and, therefore, would violate the Fourth
Amendment.118 The Supreme Court, through these decisions, requires that law
enforcement agencies act reasonably and with care when it comes to an
individual’s privacy rights.119 The best way to handle this issue is to follow the
example of the DOJ guidelines and those states with legislation requiring law
enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before using cell-site simulators.
B. The Individual’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Importantly, in today’s technological age, information “disclos[ed] to a thirdparty [service] provider, as an essential step to obtaining service altogether, does
not upend the privacy interest at stake.”120 It is almost impossible in our society
to not have a smartphone—individuals receive news updates, banking
information, texts, phone calls, and read books, all from one device, on the go,
instantaneously. Individuals do not waive their right to privacy by purchasing
the device that allows a carrier to obtain one’s location automatically. A bank
does not broadcast to the world an account holder’s routing number just because
it has the information readily available. That information is sacred, and cell
phone data is no different.
Society shapes the behaviors individuals think and believe to be acceptable
based on social norms. Society, as it stands today, would not reasonably expect

116. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“No less than an individual in a business
office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
117. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“The monitoring of a beeper in a private
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”).
118. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 404 (2012).
119. Even in some cases where the police act reasonably but without a warrant, nevertheless a
court will find the Fourth Amendment to be violated. See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 633 (N.J.
2013) (finding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right was violated even though he police
thought he took a hostage).
120. State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008) (holding limited to New Jersey law).
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that any information turned over to a service carrier dissolves her privacy
expectations.121
In addition, it would be unreasonable to think that this
information should be used against her in a criminal trial without constitutional
authority to actually obtain that information.122
III. STATE LEGISLATURE’S ROLE
As explained above, many states have adopted laws requiring local and state
law enforcement obtain a warrant before gathering data from smartphones.
Many states encompass the requirement of obtaining warrants for historical
locations, real-time location, phone records, content of electronic
communications, cell phone and internet service provider records, GPS tracking,
and StingRay tracking. But no state has passed legislation that encompasses all
these components.
It is well known that the law has and will always struggle to match pace with
technology.123 But the problem herein arises when legislation fails to encompass
all the protections it should, which forces law enforcement agencies to determine
when a warrant is necessary. Of course, there will be cases where obtaining a
warrant is impracticable, and in those instances, the warrantless search would
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, effective legislation would
address situations where law enforcement had time to get a warrant but failed to
do so, impermissibly yielding the protected information from a StingRay search.
A. The Ideal State Law for Privacy Rights
The legislation this Comment proposes has yet to be enacted by any state, but
seeks to assist states that are looking to address these concerns. The law this
Comment recommends is one that requires a warrant for all information that can
be obtained off a smartphone from a StingRay: historical location, real-time
location, phone records, content of electronic communications, cell phone and
internet service provider records. However, the law must recognize legitimate,
practical concerns for law enforcement and should only apply if the government
has a reasonable amount of time to obtain a warrant and no one’s life is endanger.
This Comment is not advocating that local and state law enforcement agencies
should never be able to obtain this information, but to obtain the information,
the agencies must do so with a valid warrant.
By adopting this proposed law, legislatures would be holding local and state
law enforcement agencies accountable, while simultaneously protecting the
individual rights of its citizens. In passing this law, the legislatures would save
time and money for themselves, state and local police departments, and state
121. See id.
122. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963).
123. See United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1150 n.16 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining
Moore’s law as “the computing power of today’s cell phone, tablet PC, laptop, etc., is likely to be,
at least, twice as powerful in two years”).
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courts. Perhaps the most important factor to consider is that through effective
legislation, instances where police failure to secure a warrant leads to the release
of potentially dangerous individuals would be diminished.
It is in the best interest of the public to keep dangerous criminals from walking
the streets. If they break the law, and if they participate in illegal activities, they
should be arrested and prosecuted by the government. But the government must
do so in a manner consistent with the protection of the Constitution, by obtaining
a warrant.
B. Role of the Judiciary
The judiciary is at the front lines of protecting individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.124 It is the first to see the warrant, and by the stroke of a
pen, judges enable or disable law enforcement to act on the warrant and conduct
a search. Judges should ask pressing questions of law enforcement personnel
who apply for warrants; they should ask about who the person of interest is, why
the department believes there is probable cause, and whether there are other
available means to figure out where the person of interest is without using the
StingRay device.125 These questions would help inform the judge to make the
proper decision.
Giving judges the opportunity to receive proper training and education about
what the StingRay devices are, what they really do, and how intrusive they can
be to an individual are vital to the privacy interests at stake. With this training,
judges will be able to fully realize the implications of each StingRay warrant.
And with each new development in technology, judges will continue to be faced
with the StingRay and other similar devices as time goes on. For judges to be
fully knowledgeable in this area of the law will allow every state to better
efficiently and effectively pursue justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, state legislatures that do not have a law addressing the StingRay
device should adopt one, as it would strike a more equitable balance between
individual privacy rights and the government’s interests in enforcing its laws.
Technology is a great tool, especially with regard to law enforcement’s interest
124. Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance,
Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 899 (2014) (“Because
courts are best positioned to extract details about hidden investigative techniques when defendants
are kept entirely in the dark, judges sitting in surveillance cases should press the government for
those details sua sponte . . . .”).
125. See Michele Adelman & Erik Schulwolf, IPhone Access Gets Attention, “Stingrays” Fly
Under the Radar, LAW360 (Apr. 5, 2016, 10:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/779899/
iphone-access-gets-attention-stingrays-fly-under-the-radar (“While it is not clear to what extent
there is—or will be—large-scale civilian use of Stingrays, the threat of such use underscores the
need for the general public to be aware of the potential danger posed by Stingray-like devices, and
for cellphone makers, cellular network providers, and governments to work to mitigate it.”).
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in public safety, and should not be viewed negatively. However, there needs to
be a balance between using advanced technology to excel society and upholding
the Framers’ intention behind the Fourth Amendment.

